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APPENDIX "'A''
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EASTERN UTAH
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

vs.
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA
and FRED REYNOLDS,

MEMOR-

ANDUM

DECISION '
Case No.
145042

Defendants.

After consideration of the motions of defendant and the arguments relating thereto, it is my
view that the answers of the jury to Interrogatories
No. 2 and 3 are not inconsistent. The finding WM
that the parties remained partners, but that plaintiff's beneficial interest in the construction project
was modified from being a partner's share of the
profits to rental for the partner's equipment. This
the parties could accomplish. The partnership rela·
tionships at the outset are not immutably cast in
stone. By mutual consent and for consideration, the
contract under which a partnership is organized
may be modified at any time, and the changes may
relate to the share of any partner in the profits. (6S
CJ'S, Section 12, Page 420.)
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II

In the trial of the case, no issue was raised
relative to plaintiff's potential obligation, should
the construction project finally show a loss. Certainly there was no proof that the job had been
finished and settled, showing a loss; neither was
there any evidence that the partnership had been
terminated and duly dissolved. If loss, instead of
gain, should be the terminal situation when the
project shall be finally settled, defendant may contend that further porceedings will be necessary in
this action. If it should show a profit, one may
reasonably expect that defendant Reynolds will be
able to pay the bills, and thus eliminate need for
further proceedings here.
Plaintiff's claim is based upon defendant Reynold's failure to pay; not that the project made or
lost money. The claim involves defendant, General
Insurance Company, because of the surety contract
it wrote, providing for payment of unpaid labor
and material bills on the job, as required by the
owner of the project.
I still believe that neither its contract for indemnity nor reliance upon principles of conventional subrogation afford defendant, General Insurance
Company, a recovery from plaintiff or a defense
to plaintiff's action. In substance, General Insurance Company is obligated to pay delinquent labor
and material bills on the job; and, upon doing so,
it will be entitled to stand in the creditor's shoes,
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asserting a creditor's claim against the principal
- in this case, the defendant Reynolds. If defendant
ReynoTas shall make the surety whole, it will have
no claim. If defendant Reynolds should be unable
to make the surety whole, the surety's claim will
be levelled at defendant Reynolds; not at the creditor to whom the surety will have been required to
make payment.
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With the possibility in mind that the job will i
show a loss and that the defendant will contend i
that, necessarily, an accounting must precede dissolution of the partnership, it may be appropriate /
to modify the judgment so that it will operate without prejudice to such proceedings. With this possible I
exception, defendant's motions should be denied.
DATED:

March 8, 1965.

BY THE COURT:

Merrill C. Faux
JUDGE
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